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Introduction 
The notion that Japan is a racially homogeneous nation is a wide and 
strongly held one. Despite an estimated total of ethnic minorities living in 
Japan of between 4 and 6 million [residents of former outcaste communities 
known as Burakumin (2-3 million, Ainu (25,000-300,000), Okinawans (1.6 
million, Koreans (700,000-1 million), Chinese (200,000), children of mixed 
ancestry (10,000-25,000), and foreigners (150,000-700,000) (Lie:4)] there has 
been no official recognition of the existence of minority populations in Japan for 
most of the post-war period. 
A 1979 report to the UN Human Rights Committee in reference to Article 27 
of the international Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which concerns the 
rights of minorities, illustrates the official position on the issue of minority 
populations within Japan well: 
The right of any person to enjoy his own culture, to profess and practice his 
religion or to use his own language is ensured under Japanese law. 
However, minorities of the kind mentioned in the Covenant do not exist in 
Japan. 
(Human Rights Committee 12th session Document No CCPR/CIlO/Add, Nov 
141980) 
There is some dispute in academic circles as to when this commonsense view 
was created. Writers such as Weiner contend that it was largely created 
during the Meiji era, and developed during Japan's years of imperialist 
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expansion. Others see the creation of the idea of the ethnically homogeneous 
nation as a more recent, postwar phenomenon in sharp contrast to multi-ethnic 
imperial Japan. All seem to agree, however, that in the postwar years the idea 
of a mono-ethnic nation was established as a kind of popular academic dogma 
through the Nihonjinron writings - a genre which aims to define the immutable 
qualities of "Japaneseness" which make Japan "unique". The idea of race, and 
the concept equivalency between land, culture and language (dependent upon 
the absence of minority populations) in Japan has formed a significant pillar of 
these writings (Sugimoto: 1999). 
Cashmore (1988: 267) writes that, 'the significance of racial labels is ... purely 
a function of the specific content attached to racial terms at a particular time 
and place.' While it is often argued that race is actually a meaningless term, if, 
as Cashmore goes on to say, "many people believe in the existence of race and so 
organize their relationships with others on the basis of that belief," (1988: 270-
271) the idea of race becomes a powerful force. 
More useful in relation to the current position of minorities in Japan than 
entering into a discussion of the meaning of the terms race and ethnicity, is an 
analysis of "the historically specific factors involved in the appearance and 
maintenance of racialised identities and relations," which have led to the 
minority experience in Japan being characterized by, "the existence of multi-
layered 'racisms', systematic exclusions and relative material disadvantage". 
(Weiner) 
Nation and Japanese blood 
Mter 250 years of Bakufu rule, which itself had relied upon a tenuous balance 
of alliances between rival lords, the Meiji government inherited a Japan, which 
had little sense of itself as a nation. As Weiner writes, the events of 1868 were 
a political, economic and social rupture, which the government attempted to 
'redefine to connote linkages with an ancient past' (Weiner 1997: 1) and to 
infuse a population, described by Yukichi Fukuzawa (Fukuzawa) as "Several 
tens of millions of humanity ... closed inside tens of millions of boxes," with a 
sense of belonging to a nation. 
The nation was represented as the kazoku kokka ('family state') sanctified by 
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a reinvigorated Shinto with the Emperor at its head, a semi-divine father of a 
nation of consanguineous unity. The Meiji state sought to establish a doctrine 
of 'Japaneseness' on which to base a strong sense of nation with which to meet 
the threat of domination by the Western imperialist powers. Japanese 
intellectuals found support for this in the theories of Social Darwinism current 
at that time in the West. 
Members of the kazoku kokka "were perceived to be related 'by blood' to one 
another and ultimately to the emperor" (Yoshino: 26). In a 1930 edition of the 
journal Nihonshugi, Ihei Setsuzo wrote that the unique qualities of the 
Japanese nation were identified as a manifestation of ketsuzokushugi (the 
ideology of the blood family). Over 40 years later Kunihiro Masao wrote that, 
''What makes a Japanese, more than anything else, is 'blood'." (Yoshino: 26) 
Yoshino comments that the disregarding of "the historical process whereby 
many peoples fused with one another to form the Japanese race in the past, the 
expression of immutable or natural aspect of Japanese identity through the 
imagined concept of Japanese blood" and the denial of the existence of 
minorities have formed the pillars which have supported the concept of the uni-
racial (tan'itsuminzoku) homogenous population proposed by the nihonjinron 
literature of the postwar period. The idea of shared blood is also relevant when 
considering the official stance taken towards the Nikkeijin. 
Yoshino contends that the term Japanese blood, 
"is socially invented not to refer to genetic traits but to mould and channel 
psychological responses concerning 'we'-ness and 'them'-ness. Given an 
opportunity to think about 'Japanese blood' consciously, the Japanese would 
certainly deny its scientific value. But the symbolic image it generates, and 
the collective sentiment expressed in it, still makes it an effective 'boundary 
marker'. (Yoshino: 24-25) 
This may well be true in contemporary Japanese society, however, theories of 
Social Darwinism were used support the idea of a hierarchy of nations. 
Fukuzawa Yukichi's 1869 Sekai kunizukushi, which sold over a million copies, 
ranked nations in a hierarchy of barbarian, semi-civilized, and civilized states 
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(he placed Japan as in transition from semi-civilized to a civilized state). "A 
corollary of this was the categorization of the other populations as members of 
equally distinct, but subordinate races." (Weiner, 1995: 449) Japan's position at 
the top of the hierarchy of East Asian nations seemed to be confirmed by the 
apparent success of imperial expansion. Within Japan itself, the destitution of 
the poor - technically part of the kazoku kokka, they were known as tenno no 
sekishi (children of the emperor) - was viewed as a confirmation of their poor 
moral characteristics (Weiner, 1997a pp). 
While other writers don't dispute the efforts to build a national identity begun 
by the Meiji state and continued through to the Second World War, Lie 
contends, that while national consciousness was certainly growing among the 
urban population, "the extent of national integration and national identity was 
limited as of 1945" (Lie, 2001: 121). He goes on to write: 
'More significantly, national identity - precisely at the moment of its 
widespread diffusion - was inflected by imperialism, which projected a 
multiethnic vision of the Japanese nation-state. The dominant conception of 
Japanese national identity in the early twentieth century was multiethnic, 
not mono-ethnic.' (Lie, 2001: 121-122) 
Lie points to the fact that even in the 1960s, most Japanese had no 
compelling response to the question of Japanese identity, quoting Ezra Vogel's 
view that in the early 1960s, an average middle-class sub-urbanite, "has not 
had an accurate definition of what is distinctly Japanese" (1971: 87). By the 
time of the celebration of the Meiji Centennial in 1968, however, the main 
premises of the Nihonjinron narrative were receiving explicit expression. 
Novelist, now turned outspoken politician (famous for his remarks concerning 
foreign workers in Japan), Ishihara Shintaro wrote, "There is no other country 
like Japan, people who are virtually monoethnic, who speak the same language 
which is like no other country's, and which has a unique culture" (Oguma 2002 
pp 317). Oguma also notes, however, that in 1994 Ishihara wrote "it is absurd 
that some people argue that Japan is a unique homogenous country", stating 
that "the Japanese are a mixture of all Asian nations" (Oguma 2002 pp 346). 
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The intellectual discourse on minzoku (usually translated as ethnicity), a 
word that did not enter popular usage until the latter half of the Meiji period, 
came to be defined by cultural criteria rather than particular physical 
attributes that determined jinshu or race. Increasingly, the usage of the two 
terms overlapped, and by the end of the Pacific War they were largely 
interchangeable. Culture came to be viewed as, as Miles puts it, "the 
manifestation of a primordial or innate essence" and began to function in the 
same way as biological determinism (Weiner 1995). 
Ethnic Minority Populations in Japan 
Wetherall and De Vos define ethnic minority groups as those groups, which 
have "separate national origins, different genetic attributes, or a history of 
outcaste status based upon ritual pollution" (Wetherall and DeVos). As well as 
the Japanese burakumin, and Okinawans, it is estimated that half a million 
other Japanese citizens suffer minority status for allegedly genetic and cultural 
differences - these include Ainu (indigenous people on the northern island of 
Hokkaido), hibakusha (atomic bomb survivors), konketsuji (children of mixed 
ancestry), kikajin (naturalized citizens), and Japanese who have returned to 
their native land after having spent their formative years abroad. According to 
the September 2002 edition of Migration News, "Japan had about 1.8 million 
foreign residents at the end of 2001; they were 1.4 percent of the 127 million 
residents. The largest groups included Koreans, 632,000; Chinese, 381,000; 
Brazilians, 266,000; and Filipinos, 157,000. Some 685,000 had permanent 
resident status, and 1.1 million were non-permanent residents, including those 
permitted to stay as spouses of Japanese nationals." The population of non-
Japanese Japanese can only be estimated as the Japanese government nor 
sociologists' surveys recognize ethnic diversity in Japan. This problem is 
compounded by the widespread tendancy for minority members to attempt to 
"pass" as mainstream Japanese in an effort to avoid discrimination in 
employment and marriage 
Burakumin 
The outcaste population - Japan's largest and, ironically, it's least visible 
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minority group - known variously as in the past as eta and kinin among other 
names, but now called Burakumin, were traditionally involved in occupations 
considered impure by the majority population. There is some debate as to from 
when outcaste status developed and as to why the defining factor of such status 
changed from occupation to bloodline after 1600. By the mid 19th Century 
however, the outcaste population was characterized by, "Large, visible 
communities, tightly regulated to segregate them from the majority, and 
regarded with contempt by most of them" (Neary: 1997: 56). The view, based 
upon ancient myths, that they were not part of the 'Japanese blood line', but 
descendents of slaves brought from the Korean peninsular during the Yamato 
period (300-365), persisted despite their formal emancipation in 1871. It was 
not until a 1965 deliberative Council Report that the idea that they were 
racially or ethnically different from the majority Japanese population was 
officially repudiated. 
Though now considered as physically indistinguishable from majority 
Japanese and facing no formal barriers to integration and intermarriage, 
continued identification and discrimination against them offer good grounds to 
consider them as ethnic group. Burakumin living in contemporary Japan can 
only be identified by his or her place of residence. Japan's rigid nationwide 
registration system, and interest in family origins (particularly when it comes 
to marriage) make life difficult even for Burakumin, who wish try and pass in 
majority society. 
Burakumin have been the most vocal minority in their pursuit to end 
discrimination. An extensive 1993 survey showed evidence of improved income 
levels, educational performance and lower discrimination in marriage. 
However, the number of Burakumin receiving government income support was 
way above the national average, and numbers going on to higher education 
were half the national figure. Some question whether improvements indicate a 
real change in attitudes on the part of the majority or merely reflect the fact 
that it has become more difficult to determine whether an individual has a 
Burakumin background. 
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Ainu 
The case of the indigenous people of northern Japan, "dispossessed of their 
ancestral land and resources by the expansion of a vigorous colonial state" 
(Siddle: 17), represents the clearest case of "historical amnesia" that 
characterizes the issue of minorities in Japan. The 'victor's history' has long 
portrayed Japanese involvement in Hokkaido as exploration followed by 
development, rather than aggressive colonialism aimed at exploiting its 
strategic and economic potential, and employing policies of relocation and 
assimilation aimed at the eventual extinction of the Ainu. 
The new Meiji era concepts of race and nation, combined with the theories of 
Social Darwinism in vogue at the time saw the 'hairy Ainu' as a 'primitive race' 
doomed to extinction (Nitobe quoted in Weiner:1995:12) in the 'struggle for 
survival'. It is perhaps not surprising considering the Ainu's extreme lack of 
power and resources that the 'dying race' prophecy became self-fulfilling, and 
that by the early 20th century they were only barely managing to survive. 
Wetherall and De Vos wrote in the 1970s that the "present attitude of majority 
Japanese towards Ainu is one of condescending quaintness ... Like Native 
American Culture, the remnants of Ainu culture have been commercialized in 
the face of majority cultural oppression." 
Until recently the 'myth of homogeneity' has denied the existence ofthe Ainu 
as an ethnic minority, regarding them as either totally assimilated or 
biologically extinct. "Ascribed in local society a negative, essentialised 'racial' 
identity ... that overrode socio-economic, occupational or gender roles, but 
denied under the notion of national homogeneity any possibility of a positive 
'Ainu' self-identification as a minority group, most Ainu existed in an 
identityless void that could only be escaped by passing." (Siddle 1997: 26) 
Indigenous support for the Ainu Kyokai diminished as Ainu increasingly tried 
to disown their heritage. The commemorations which began with the 1968 
celebration of Hokkaido's 'first' 100 years of history almost entirely ignored the 
Ainu, producing widespread resentment and marked the start of a 
reinvigoration of Ainu consciousness. Terrorist acts committed not by Ainu, 
but by sympathetic Wajin (as majority Japanese are known among Ainu) helped 
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change perception of the Ainu from an interesting museum piece into an Ainu 
mondai (problem), and moved them from tourist brochures onto the front page. 
While the government enacted a large-scale welfare project (Hokkaido Utari 
Fukushi Taisaku) in the 1970s it re-iterated that "we definitely do not take the 
standpoint that the Ainu are a separate people (minzoku) within the citizenry of 
Japan" (Siddle: 1997: 34). However, a sense of Ainu nationhood was 
developing, encouraged by identification with the struggles of indigenous 
peoples elsewhere in the world, and they were attempting to "redefine the 
relationship with the state in terms of a culturally and historically unique 
group with distinct rights. The Ainu as an indigenous people were not just 
another disadvantaged social group in need of state welfare but a nation 
desirous of decolonisation" (Siddle 1997: 34-35). 
The replacement of the 1899 Protection Law in the late 1990s, although a 
much watered-down version than that demanded by the Utari Kyokai, did have 
a resolution paired with it that for the first time that acknowledged the 
existence of an indigenous ethnic minority in Japan. However, Siddle comes to 
the discouraging conclusion that, "within Japan at large, the dominant 
narratives of national homogeneity and peaceful development in Hokkaido 
remain secure enough to ensure that despite growing Wajin support, the 
majority of the population still know little, and care even less, about Ainu 
demands." (Siddle: 1997: 43). 
Okinawans 
The Okinawan kingdom long paid nominal tribute to the Chinese court, even 
when under the suzerainty of Satsuma's Shimizu clan. The Meiji government 
laid claim to the islands in 1872, and in 1879 annexed and made them into a 
prefecture. Over the following decades Japanese sugar companies disrupted 
the traditional economy, and the people where subjected to great pressure to 
assimilate into mainstream Japanese culture. 
After 1945 many Okinawans interpreted US occupation forces opposition to 
the introduction of democratic government at the prefectural level until 1968, 
as being based on a belief that they were unable to govern themselves when the 
Japanese were. That similar attitudes were held by the Japanese seemed to be 
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confirmed by the almost complete exclusion of Okinawan opinion III 
negotiations over the reversion of Okinawa to Japan in 1972. Creighton writes 
that "Okinawans, living at a distance from the four main islands of the 
Japanese archipelago, and generally having lower economic status, are 
Japanese citizens but excluded from a mainstream Japanese identity," and that 
Okinawans may have come to regard their skin color, generally darker than 
mainstream Japanese, accordingly (Creighton: 1997: 228). Many Okinawans, 
ashamed of their ethnic identity, attempted to pass as mainstream Japanese. 
In 1985, the then governor of Okinawa, Niishime Junji, stated that he, by all 
appearances having achieved great success in Japanese society, having 
attempted to assimilate Japanese identity, had failed. 
Although there has been far less overt discrimination against Okinawans 
since 1972 than before the Pacific war and, helped by expressions of ethnic 
pride on the part of the large overseas Okinawan population and other 
indigenous populations, far fewer Okinawans feel ashamed of their identity vis-
a-vis Japanese, problems still remain. Creighton questions whether the 
attitudes of the majority of mainstream Japanese towards Okinawan ethnicity 
have come as far as those of Okinawans themselves. 
Chinese 
Contacts between China and Japan go back over 2000 years, and there has 
always been a Chinese presence in Japan, particularly around the ports of 
Kyushu and in the major cities around the Inland Sea. Despite China having 
been the source of much of what can be described as high Japanese culture, 
Wagamatsu writes that, "present day Japan feels less and less cultural debt" 
(Vasishth: 1997: 115). Indeed, while a cursory look at mainstream Japanese 
television programs shows the Japanese fascination with 'idea' of Asia, and China 
in particular, non- Japanese Asians are often spoken of in derogatory terms. 
As noted at the beginning ofthis paper, the traditional Sino-centric worldview 
was rejected by Japan as it's own nativist scholarship strove to assert itself, and 
it became exposed to Western learning. China's inability to withstand western 
imperialist designs, defeat by Japan in the war of 1894-5, and the apparent 
reversal of the traditional teacher-student relationship, seemed to confirm 
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Social Darwinist assumptions of superiority. Despite the economic success of 
the small Chinese community in the Meiji period, they were never accorded the 
respect of their Western counterparts (Vasishth 1997 pp 136). Although, along 
with other non-Japanese Asian migrant workers they were the first to be laid 
off in times of recession they came to be seen as a threat to Japanese workers. 
After 1945, around 60,000 Chinese-speaking residents returned to their 
homelands (Taiwan and mainland China) while 30,000 remained. The May 
1947 Alien Registration Law classified Chinese, along with the other hitherto 
daisankokujin citizens of the empire, as aliens. The law effectively 
disenfranchised them from a wide range of social and welfare benefits and 
employment in the public sector (Vasishth: 1997: 132). In contrast with the far 
more numerous Korean minority, the Chinese minority, supported by a 
traditional network of guilds and associations went on to become a successful, if 
not fully respected minority. 
Koreans 
Despite a long and close relationship between Japan and Korea during their 
early history, in 1910 Japan fulfilled a long held territorial ambition by 
annexing the Korean peninsular. In the following years hundreds of 
thousands of Koreans emmigrated to Japan where industry needed cheap labor 
to replace the workers lost to the overseas battlefields during the Pacific War. 
According to the official line the Korean immigrants may well have been the 
"emperor's people", but there was a great deal of mistrust of them among the 
Japanese - illustrated by the massacre of thousands of Koreans (as well as 
Chinese and Okinawans) in the aftermath of the 1923 Great Kanto earthquake, 
after a rumor was spread that Koreans were poisoning the water supply. This 
incident was echoed recently in Tokyo Governor, Ishihara Shintaro's declaration 
after 1992's annual earthquake drill that Japan's Self-Defence Forces must be 
at the ready as, "Atrocious crimes have been committed again and again by 
sangokujin who have entered the country illegally. In the event of a major 
earthquake, riots could break out." 
Of the more than 600,000 Koreans currently resident in Japan, most are third 
generation Koreans born in Japan, speak Japanese as their first and often only 
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language, and by most definitions can be said to be culturally Japanese. 
However, their social, economic and political rights are constrained by their 
continued alien status. Unemployment rates among Koreans are much higher 
than for the population as a whole and they are disproportionately represented 
in the poorly paid and insecure service and entertainment industries, small 
non-unionized sub-contracting companies and the construction industry 
(Weiner: 1997b). As a result of a general inability to accumulate wealth, many 
Korean children have been denied access to opportunities in state sector higher 
education, and Juvenile delinquency among Korean youth is relatively high, as 
is Korean involvement in criminal activity. 
Nikkeijin 
By October 1969, there were reported to be 1,062,293 foreigners of Japanese 
ancestry, known as Nikkeijin, in countries throughout the world. However, in 
the context of the issue of foreign migrant workers in Japan, the term Nikkeijin 
refers specifically to South American descendents up to the third generation 
and their spouses, mainly those from Brazil and Peru (also known as dekasegi -
a word that originally refered to sojourners from remote regions who left their 
homes to work in urban factories). Around 220,000 Brazilians of Japanese 
descent had moved to Japan between 1990 and 1999 (Romero: 1999), making 
them the third largest group of foreign nationals living in Japan after Koreans 
and Chinese. 
In the late 1980s, the booming Japanese economy faced a severe unskilled 
labor shortage. With fewer young Japanese interested in what are known as 
3K (kitanai/dirty, kikenldangerous, kibishii/difficult) occupations, illegal foreign 
immigrant workers, largely from north, south-east, and central Asia, filled this 
growing void in the Japanese workforce. While industry was concerned that it 
needed a large low-cost workforce in the face of the higher aspirations of young 
Japanese combined with an ageing population and low birth rate, the 
government was concerned about the creation of permanent illegal immigrant 
communities which it believed could lead to social tension. 
As, according to the Japanese Nationality Law which bases nationality on 
bloodline a Japanese national born in a foreign country must choose one or 
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other nationality before the age of 22, very few second generation emigrants 
held Japanese nationality. However, in changes to immigration status in 
1985, and in 1990 in the revision of the Immigration Control Law 'the 
government tacitly permitted illegal employment' (Selleck: 1997: 188). The 
1990 revision created a new immigration category of 'long term resident,' 
allowing stays of up to 3 years, and opened up the possibility of immigration to 
Nikkeijin up to the 6th degree of consanguinity. 
Despite the fact that the government had shown little interest in the 
Nikkeijin emigrants prior to 1990, and that the Nikkeijin themselves generally 
had little contact with their relatives in Japan, the official view concerning the 
Nikkeijin is that: 
they would like to see the country where their ancestors grew up and wish to 
visit their relatives in Japan ... [as) ... it will cost money for a Nikkeijin to stay 
with relatives in Japan in order to recover the cost of the visit. The 
Immigration Control Law was not revised for the purpose of promoting their 
employment in Japan." (Selleck: 1997: 204) 
In fact, with no restrictions on the activities that can been undertaken in 
Japan, "these visas can be described as de facto working visas" (Selleck: 1997: 
189). The changes resulted in an almost immediate huge influx of South 
American Nikkeijin. Generally employed in the industrial sector, and accorded 
a low social status, they have become what Selleck calls a kind of "migrant labor 
aristocracy" above illegal foreign workers. 
Despite the collapse of the "bubble economy" Nikkeijin have tended to remain 
in Japan longer, and the number returning to Japan more than once is 
increasing. Indeed, a 1998 report found a broad range of industries in 
Hamamatsu, in Shizuoka Prefecture, to be "structurally dependent" upon 
foreign workers. The central government has generally treated the Nikkeijin 
phenomenon and it's attendant problems in the same way as it has dealt with 
other minority populations - by largely ignoring them. It has been left to local 
governments to take responsibility for all their citizens, whether Japanese or 
not. The report mentioned above concludes that Japan must "recognize the 
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long term, structural character of the demand for foreign-born labor in their 
economies .. , and grapple seriously with the challenges of integrating foreign 
workers and their children as permanent residents and potential future 
citizens." (Cornelius & Kuwahara 1998) 
Hamamatsu, where over 11,000 Brazilian Japanese were living as of 2001, 
provides an example of the kind of problems that can be expected to increase as 
the foreign worker population increases without effective attempts to integrate 
them into the Japanese community. In Homi Danchi, a public housing 
complex in which 3000 of the 10,000 residents are Japanese-Brazilians, 
relations between them and the Japanese residents are strained, and there are 
almost daily disputes over noise, garbage and parking. The involvement in 
petty crime, stealing cars, and shoplifting of some Brazilians triggered a 
xenophobic backlash and cases of right-wing nationalists gathering outside 
Brazilians' homes, shouting "foreigners go home" have been reported. In 1999, 
a jewelry store owner was ordered by a district court to pay a Brazilian woman 
1.5 million yen in damages after he ordered her out of the store in June 1998, 
because she was a foreigner. The actions of the owner, who had placed signs in 
his store saying that foreigners were banned from the premises in an attempt to 
reduce theft, were ruled to be in violation of the International Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, signed by Japan in 1995. 
Conclusion 
In 1999, Economic Planning Agency chief Taichi Sakaiya stated that with the 
prospect of some 35% of the Japanese population being over 60 years old by 
2025, and the overall decline in the population after 2007, it is "inevitable" that 
Japan will need foreign workers in the range of 10 to 30% of the population 
decline (Japan ponders economic rescue by immigrants, The Guardian, Aug 5 
1999). It seems clear that unless integration of the increasing number of 
foreign workers and their families, who are staying for longer and longer 
periods of time, friction with the Japanese majority community, 
disenfranchisement of and increased disenchantment among the foreign 
communities will only increase. Bearing in mind the history of how Japan has 
dealt with ethnic minorities in the past, the prospects for avoiding increased 
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ethnic tension are not encouraging. 
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